Billionaires’ Row and Tehran’s Money: What Estate Agents Must Learn from a £150m London Property Empire

July 2, 2026
Posted by: FCS Compliance
Category: Blog, Property Market

On a tree-lined street in north London known as Billionaires’ Row, a cluster of grand mansions has sat empty for years, hidden behind high hedges and security gates. According to a year-long Bloomberg investigation, the trail of ownership runs from The Bishops Avenue, through layers of offshore companies, back to one of the most powerful families in Iran.

The properties are alleged to form part of a global investment empire worth in excess of £100 million, with around £150 million tied up in London property alone, assembled on behalf of Mojtaba Khamenei, the second-eldest son of Iran’s Supreme Leader. The man named on much of the paperwork is Ali Ansari, a 57-year-old businessman the UK sanctioned in October 2025 and described as a “corrupt Iranian banker and businessman” with links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Ansari denies any financial relationship with Khamenei or the IRGC and has said he intends to challenge the sanctions.

For estate agents, the detail that matters is not the geopolitics. It is how ordinary-looking transactions, handled by UK professionals, allegedly moved this money for more than a decade.

How was a £150m property empire built in plain sight?

The purchases were not buried in a vault. They went through the open market. A £73 million collection of mansions on The Bishops Avenue was bought in 2013 through Birch Ventures Ltd, a company registered in the Isle of Man. A £33.7 million newbuild followed in 2014. Two apartments close to Kensington Palace, on a street that also backs onto the Israeli embassy, were bought in 2014 and 2016 for a combined £35.75 million. Ansari, it emerged, held passports for Cyprus, St Kitts and Nevis, and Iran.

Each deal used a familiar toolkit: offshore companies, a proxy name on the documents, and a buyer whose real source of wealth sat several steps removed from the transaction. Transparency International UK estimates that figures linked to the Iranian regime have bought more than £200 million of UK property in total.

As Ben Cowdock of Transparency International UK put it: “Lawyers, estate agents and banks should have been on high alert when dealing with transactions relating to politically connected Iranian investors, however this first line of defence against illicit wealth appears to have been breached repeatedly.”

Why does this matter for estate agents now?

Two things lift this above an ordinary headline. First, estate agency businesses (EABs) are a recognised reporting sector under the Money Laundering Regulations, and HMRC expects you to be the first line of defence, not the last. Second, the timing. With tensions around Iran running high and the UK due to host an Illicit Finance Summit at Lancaster House, where real estate sits alongside crypto and gold as one of three priority themes, property is squarely in the spotlight.

We set out the immediate sanctions, terrorist financing (TF) and proliferation financing (PF) implications in our earlier briefing, Iran-Related Risk: A Timely TF and PF Reminder for UK Estate Agency Businesses. This case study is the real-world illustration of why those controls matter.

What were the warning signs?

Read back through the case and the red flags are textbook ones:

Offshore and opaque ownership: companies registered in the Isle of Man and the British Virgin Islands, with the ultimate owner obscured.
A proxy on the paperwork: the person named on the documents was not the person alleged to control or benefit from the asset.
Unclear source of funds and source of wealth: money routed through several jurisdictions before reaching the purchase.
A higher-risk jurisdiction and a politically exposed person (PEP): an investor connected to a sanctioned regime.
Assets left idle: super-prime homes bought and then left derelict, with no obvious economic rationale.

None of these on its own proves wrongdoing. Together, they are exactly the pattern that should prompt an agent to pause and ask harder questions.

What should estate agents do about it?

The lesson is not to fear high-value or overseas clients. It is to make sure your AML checks see past the paperwork. In practice, that means:

Identify the beneficial owner, not just the named buyer, and keep going until you understand who is really behind a company or trust.
Establish source of funds and source of wealth for high-value and higher-risk instructions, and record how you reached your view.
Run sanctions and PEP screening on every party, including beneficial owners and connected entities, and refresh it during the transaction.
Apply enhanced due diligence (EDD) where a higher-risk jurisdiction, complex structure or PEP is involved.
Escalate to your MLRO and, where suspicion arises, submit a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the National Crime Agency (NCA). Report relevant sanctions matters to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) without delay.

These are not new obligations. The Khamenei case simply shows what happens when they are treated as a tick-box exercise rather than genuine professional judgement. For a worked example of how this plays out on a single instruction, see our property proliferation financing case study.

How can FCS Compliance help

Our expert team can handle your complex CDD Cases

The hardest part of cases like this is not knowing the rule; it is the digging. That is exactly the work our analysts do every day. If a complex or high-value instruction is testing your checks, our Customer Due Diligence (CDD) team can take on the investigation, from source of funds tracing to beneficial ownership and sanctions screening, for UK and overseas individuals, trusts and companies.

Frequently asked questions

Are estate agents legally required to carry out AML checks?

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Yes. Estate agency businesses are supervised by HMRC under the Money Laundering Regulations and must carry out customer due diligence, including identifying beneficial owners and establishing source of funds, before and during a transaction.

What is a politically exposed person (PEP), and why does it matter in property deals?

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A PEP is someone entrusted with a prominent public function, together with their family members and close associates. Deals connected to a PEP, especially from a higher-risk jurisdiction, require enhanced due diligence because of the greater risk of corruption or sanctioned wealth.

How far back should source of funds checks go?

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Far enough to satisfy yourself that you understand where the money genuinely originated, not just the account it arrived from. For high-value or complex cases this can mean tracing funds through several entities and jurisdictions.

What should an estate agent do if a property deal looks suspicious?

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Pause the transaction where necessary, escalate to your MLRO, and submit a SAR to the NCA if there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering. Where financial sanctions may apply, report to OFSI without delay.

About the author

Stephen Williamson, MICA (AML Dip), Lead AML Consultant, FCS Compliance.

Stephen spent 17 years working in the banking industry, specialising in both property finance and managing fraud and anti-money laundering teams for a range of organisations, from tier 1 banks to electronic money institutions. Stephen also has first-hand experience of the London property market, having spent many years both working for and running a property development firm. He is a member of the International Compliance Association (ICA), holding a Diploma in Anti-Money Laundering.

Sources and further reading

Bloomberg, “How the Son of Iran’s Supreme Leader Built a Global Property Empire” (28 January 2026).
The Times, “Iranian tycoon ‘amassed £150m property empire for Ayatollah’s son’” (5 March 2026).
Transparency International UK, “London’s role in Iran’s financial networks, and why it matters now” (12 March 2026).