When Dirty Money Comes House-Hunting: What the Prince Group Case Means for UK Property Professionals

The UK property market has long been attractive to international investors. Recent sanctions against the Prince Group highlight a far darker reality: how organised crime, opaque offshore structures and weak due diligence allowed billions in suspected criminal proceeds to flow into British bricks and mortar. For estate agents, developers and property professionals, this case is a stark reminder that AML risk is not theoretical. It is already embedded in the market.

Case overview: a £46bn criminal enterprise and a UK spending spree

Headed by Chen Zhi, the Prince Group has been labelled by the United States as a transnational criminal organisation, accused of large-scale fraud, corruption, human trafficking and the use of forced labour. While the group strongly denies wrongdoing, investigators allege it generated as much as £46 billion through global scam operations spanning more than 30 countries.

Faced with the challenge of moving and storing vast sums of money, the group is believed to have turned to the UK as one jurisdiction through which to launder their money. Chen Zhi reportedly made London his second home, purchasing high-value commercial and residential property, acquiring luxury vehicles and enrolling his children in private schools. Viewed through an AML lens, these activities present multiple red flags.

In 2025, UK authorities froze a number of assets linked to Chen Zhi, including a £12 million mansion in North London, a £100 million office building in the City of London and at least 17 luxury flats. As the Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper stated at the time, those behind the scheme were “buying up London homes to store their money”.

How UK property became a laundering vehicle

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this case is not only the scale of investment, but how easily it appears to have happened.

Investigations show that many acquisitions were made using offshore corporate structures, particularly companies registered in the British Virgin Islands. In one notable example, a £94 million London office block was acquired through the share purchase of a BVI company holding the asset. This is a complex and relatively niche transaction type that should always trigger enhanced due diligence.

Other purchases reportedly included off-plan new-build apartments, an area now formally recognised by the UK Government as higher risk due to weaker controls compared with the resale market.

Despite extensive media reporting as early as 2020 highlighting Chen Zhi’s political connections and alleged criminal links in Cambodia, UK professionals appear to have accepted explanations of wealth that banks elsewhere had already questioned or rejected.

Trusts, offshore secrecy and why transparency matters

This case also exposes the opaque nature of trusts and offshore vehicles when robust AML controls are missing. The Prince Group made extensive use of shell companies across the UK’s Overseas Territories, including the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, masking beneficial ownership and limiting meaningful scrutiny.

US authorities designated dozens of offshore entities linked to the group, raising serious questions about whether:

  • Beneficial owners were properly identified
  • Source of wealth and source of funds were genuinely verified
  • Obvious red flags were escalated or quietly overlooked

For property professionals, the message is clear. Complex structures do not reduce risk. They increase it.

Key AML lessons for UK property professionals

This case provides several practical and highly relevant takeaways:

  1. High-value overseas buyers require enhanced scrutiny
    Politically exposed persons, complex ownership structures and international wealth sources should always prompt enhanced due diligence, not superficial checks.
  2. Source of wealth must be credible, not just documented
    Vague references to commercial success or unexplained rapid accumulation of wealth should be challenged. Paperwork alone is not enough.
  3. Trusts and offshore companies demand deeper questioning
    Who ultimately controls the entity? Why is the structure being used? Does it make commercial and geographic sense?
  4. Off-plan and share-purchase transactions carry elevated risk
    These transactions require heightened vigilance, particularly where multiple units are acquired or funds originate offshore.

5. Media and open-source intelligence matters
 Adverse reporting should feed directly into risk assessments and decision-making processes

Final thought

The Prince Group case demonstrates how easily the UK property market can be exploited when AML controls fail, and how legal, regulatory and reputational risk ultimately lands with the professionals involved.

If your team is dealing with overseas buyers, trusts, offshore companies or complex funding structures, now is the time to ensure they are properly trained to identify and manage risk.

FCS Compliance provides practical AML training and guidance tailored specifically for UK property professionals.

 Get in touch to ensure your team knows what to ask, what to spot and when to walk away


About the Author

Stephen Williamson MICA, Dip (AML)

Lead AML Consultant

Stephen spent 17 years working in the banking industry, specialising in both property finance and managing fraud and anti-money laundering teams for a range of organisations, from tier 1 banks to electronic money institutions. Stephen also has first-hand experience of the London property market, having spent many years both working for and running a property development firm. He is a member of the International Compliance Association (ICA), holding a Diploma in Anti-Money Laundering.